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Heterogeneity and Performance in Tournaments:
A Test for Incentive Effects using Professional Tennis Data
Uwe Sunde∗
IZA, Bonn
March 3, 2007
Abstract
This paper provides an approach to test whether greater heterogeneity of contestants
leads to lower effort exertion in elimination tournaments, as predicted by conventional tour-
nament models. This prediction is difficult to test with real world data because effort is
difficult to measure. Based on a simple behavioral model, testable implications are derived
and an identification strategy is suggested that allows to test for an incentive effect of hetero-
geneity even when effort is unobservable. The application uses data from professional tennis
tournaments and provides evidence that heterogeneity affects the incentives to exert effort.
JEL-classification: J4, J3, M5
Keywords: Elimination Tournaments, Uneven Tournaments, Incentives in Tournaments,
Tennis
∗Contact Address: IZA, Schaumburg-Lippe Str. 9, 53113 Bonn, Tel. +49-0228-3894-221, email: sunde@iza.org.
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1 Introduction
Firms frequently use promotion tournaments to provide their workers with incentives for effort
exertion by posting a prize to be won by the relatively best performing contestant. Theory
predicts that the total amount of effort to win the prize exerted in the course of a tournament
is highest when the contestants are homogeneous (see Lazear and Rosen 1981, Rosen 1986,
and Prendergast 1999). Uneven tournaments, where one contestant is ex ante stronger than
the other(s), result in lower effort exertion of the contestants. Intuitively, the larger the initial
disadvantage of the underdog, the more costly it is for him in terms of effort to compensate for the
handicap. On the other hand, the favorite knows about his advantage and can reduce his efforts
without endangering his prospects of success. The assumption of performance incentives through
prizes has received some empirical support, see e.g. Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a, 1990b)
for evidence from golf tournaments.1 However, the negative incentive effect of heterogeneity of
contestants has so far not been tested with non-experimental data because of the difficulties
associated with measuring heterogeneity and effort.2
This paper is a first attempt to close this obvious gap in the literature. Testing the incen-
tive effects of heterogeneity with real world data is important in view of the widespread use
of tournaments and the fact that heterogeneity of contestants is the rule rather than the ex-
ception. I use data from the final two rounds of the most prestigious tennis tournaments for
professionals from the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) to test the prediction that
higher ex ante heterogeneity reduces incentives to provide effort. Tennis data are particularly
well suited for this, since they perfectly replicate the simple setting of a two-person tournament,
allowing for the clearest theoretical predictions. The structure of information available in tennis
data closely resembles the structure and requirements of information in theoretical models of
one-shot tournaments. At the same time, tennis contests resemble the environment of a cor-
porate tournament, and involve considerable stakes for the players. Prizes are known for each
tournament and at each stage. The strength of players can be inferred from their position in
the world ranking prior to the respective tournament, allowing to construct a measure of the
heterogeneity of the contestants that is generally not available in other data. Rankings and
prizes in the data are predetermined and common knowledge before the match begins, which
1 Several theoretical predictions concerning incentives through prizes have recently been confirmed in empirical
studies using firm-level data, see Eriksson (1999) and Bognanno (2001).
2 Abrevaya (2002) examines the determinants of winning probabilities of ex ante unequal players in professional
bowling but does not consider effort exertion. Experimental studies dealing with uneven tournaments include
Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt (1987), Schotter and Weigelt (1992), and more recently Harbring and Ruchala
(2003). None of these directly tests the effect of varying heterogeneity on effort.
1
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meets the requirements of the theory and avoids problems of endogeneity. Moreover, unlike
in the context of intermediate-level firm data, tennis tournaments end with the final. Thus,
prize money for reaching and/or winning the final is a good proxy for the prize of winning the
elimination tournament implied by matches on the two last rounds of tennis tournaments.
Similar to settings in firms, effort exerted by tennis players is not directly observable by the
principal or the audience (including the econometrician), which constitutes the major empirical
problem in testing for the existence of an incentive effect caused by player heterogeneity. On
the basis of a simple structural model of a tennis match, this paper derives testable implications
that can be tested even if effort is not directly observable. The identification strategy rests on
the observation that the omitted variable bias caused by unobservable effort has different effects
for favorites and underdogs in a match. The empirical results suggest that the hypothesis that
heterogeneity has no effect on incentives and effort exertion can be rejected.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data, section 3 presents a simple
statistical model of a tennis match that can be used to derive behavioral predictions, and that
serves as basis for the empirical implementation. The section ends by describing the identification
strategy used in the application. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and section 5 concludes.
2 Data from Professional Tennis Tournaments
The data are provided by the ATP and comprise information for 156 tournaments of the most
and second most prestigious categories, Grand Slam and Master Series, for male tennis profes-
sionals for the years 1990 until 2002.3 In particular, the data stem from the four Grand Slam
tournaments per year: Australian Open (Melbourne), Roland Garros (Paris), U.S. Open (New
York), and Wimbledon (London). Additionally, the following eight Masters tournaments are
included in the data: Cincinnati, Hamburg, Monte Carlo, Montreal, NASDAQ-100 (Miami),
Pacific Life (Indian Wells), BNP Paribas (Paris), and Rome. For each tournament and year, the
data contain detailed match information including the names of the respective players as well
as their current ranking in the ATP Champion’s Race, where players are ranked according to
their performance in Grand Slam and Masters tournaments as well as their result in the Masters
Cup and their five best results from International Series Tournaments in the year previous to
the match, the numbers of games and sets won by each player in each respective match, and the
identity of the winner of each match.4 To ensure sufficient random variation in the heterogeneity
3 Data and relevant links are available on the internet under http://www.atptennis.com.
4 Missing rankings are replaced by the last available ranking, possibly from the previous year. Note that the
lower the rank, the better a player, i.e. the player ranked 1 had the best performance of all tennis professionals
2
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Observations (N) Mean Std. Dev.
Individual Games won 920 14.67 5.95
Individual Games won per set P 920 4.84 1.36
Absolute difference in Ranks HET 460 19.30 25.03
Total Prize Money ($1,000) 156 2,646.24 1,449.48
Prize for winning current round 460 246.29 153.78
($1,000)
of opponents and avoid effects of initial seedings, only data for the last two rounds, that is for
semifinals and finals, are used.5 Eliminating matches with missing information on games won
or suspended matches due to injury leaves a total of 460 matches comprising 920 observations
for individual players. Table 1 provides some summary statistics.
3 Empirical Model
3.1 A Simple Structural Model of a Tennis Match
Consider the following simple tournament model: two players, a favorite f and an underdog u
compete for the (stage) prize $ that accrues to the winner of a tennis match. The two players
differ with respect to their ability ai, i = f, u, to play, where af > au. Both players can choose
their effort levels, ef ≥ 0 and eu ≥ 0, respectively, in order to affect their probability to win the
match. The match itself consists of a certain number of balls, and, abstracting from the precise
rules for winning a tennis match, the likelihood of winning the match increases in the number
of balls won.6 Let the strength of play of a player during a given ball b be given by Sfb and
Sub, respectively. This strength of play depends on the players’ respective effort levels eib, their
ability ai and a vector of other characteristics X, including factors like the stage price, the type
of soil, season etc. Let us assume for simplicity that this relationship is linear, such that
Sib = αai + βeib + γ′Xi + εib , i = f, u . (1)
The last term, εib, reflects a random component affecting the strength of play during a given
ball b. This component of luck can be interpreted as a propensity to commit a mistake, or
over the year.
5 This setting is conservative as any effects should be biased towards zero if the slacking-off due to heterogeneity
is stronger in earlier rounds of the tournament.
6 As will become clear below, abstracting from the precise technicalities involved, like the crucial role of the
number of sets won in determining the match winner, simplifies the analysis substantially without affecting the
results too much.
3
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equally to hit an ingenious ball. Given that there are many ways to commit a mistake and
loose or win a ball, it is natural to assume that εib is distributed according to a type-1 extreme
value distribution, given that it is the first failure in one of many dimensions that leads to a
mistake and the end of the ball. For convenience, we assume that εfb and εub are distributed
independently, which can be justified by the fact that players commit their mistakes individually
and independently from their opponent on the other side of the net (assuming technical fouls
are forbidden). The favorite wins a given ball b if
Sfb ≥ Sub ⇔ αaf + βefb + γ′Xf − αau + βeub + γ′Xu > εub − εfb , (2)
while the underdog wins it otherwise. Given this structure, εub − εfb are independent draws
from a log Weibull distribution.7 The probability to win a given ball b is therefore given by a
standard logit model, such that
Pr(favorite wins ball) =
eα(af−au)+β(efb−eub)+γ′(Xf−Xu)
1 + eα(af−au)+β(efb−eub)+γ′(Xf−Xu)
, (3)
and the associated likelihood given information on an entire match could be estimated as
Lf = Π
(# balls f)
eα(af−au)+β(ef−eu)+γ′(Xf−Xu)
1 + eα(af−au)+β(ef−eu)+γ′(Xf−Xu)
· Π
(# balls u)
1
1 + eα(af−au)+β(ef−eu)+γ′(Xf−Xu)
.
(4)
The log odds ratio of the favorite rather than the underdog winning a given ball is consequently
given by
ln
(
Pr(favorite wins ball)
Pr(underdog wins ball)
)
= α(af − au) + β(efb − eub) + γ′(Xf −Xu) , (5)
which is a function of the relative strength of play of both players, Sfb − Sub.
However, in the application to ATP data, we do not have information on every single ball
played, or the associated effort levels, so that this model is not directly applicable. As is explained
in the data section, the data are aggregated on the level of an entire match, including the total
numbers of games and sets won by each player. Moreover, the odds ratio is of little use in tennis,
where the rules of the game not necessarily imply that the player winning the most games wins
the match. The model so far does neglect issues like the rules of winning a tennis match, in
particular the endogeneity of the duration of a match. For the purpose of estimating a model of
effort choice, it is important to control for the inherent endogeneity of the number of sets played,
or the duration of the match in terms of the total number of games played. Hence, applying the
odds ratio in this context does not seem appropriate, in particular since it is merely instrumental
and does not allow to use all individual observations independently for the estimation.
7 See Kennedy (2003), p. 275-276, for details.
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Consequently, in what follows we modify the framework in order to be applicable to the
data at hand. Given the proportions data on the match level, we concentrate on average effort
exertion during a match, rather than on the effort exerted to win a given ball. Optimal strategies
of a player refer to the effort level for the entire match. This assumption neglects any dynamics
of effort exertion during a match. On the other hand, it reflects the usual notion of a one-shot
decision prevalent in the (theoretical and empirical) tournament literature (see e.g. Lazear and
Rosen, 1981). The probability to win a match increases monotonically in the proportion of games
won by a player, rather than the odds ratio of a given point. A sensible implementation has
to control for the endogeneity of the duration of the match. This can be done by normalizing
the number of games won by a player using information on the number of sets played, and
estimating the model separately for favorites and underdogs, allowing for dependencies in the
error structure. Such a specification takes into account that, in order to increase their chance to
win the tennis match, players have to win as many games as possible, rather than the majority
of games. With data on players i, j = f, u meeting in match m in tournament k, a corresponding
specification of the relative strength of play during the match that can be directly estimated by
OLS is
lnPimk = α(aimk − ajmk) + β(eimk − ejmk) + γ′Xmk + uimk , (6)
where Pimk is the average number of games per set (or match) that player i wins, which is
directly related to the average differential in the strength of play, Sf − Su during the match
under observation. This reflects a modified version of a linear probability model to deal with
proportions data that uses observations on both players.8 Potential dependencies between the
opponents in a given match are taken into account by allowing the error components ²imj to be
heteroskedastic and correlated between the players of a given match m.
3.2 Derivation of Testable Hypotheses
That stage prizes provide stronger incentives for effort exertion, while effort provision decreases
with the heterogeneity of players is a well-known result in the tournament literature (see e.g.
Lazear and Rosen, 1981, Rosen, 1986, and Prendergast, 1999). This subsection derives these
results within the framework laid out before, following the treatment of Prendergast (1999).
Consider the optimal strategies of a player, given that he can only choose one effort level for
the entire match, and concentrate on pure strategy equilibria.9 For simplicity, abstract from
8 See Greene (1997, pp. 894-896) and Kennedy (2003, pp. 264-266) for formal derivations.
9 These assumptions constitute a substantial simplification. In fact, Klaassen and Magnus (2001) show that the
probability of winning a point is not independent from who won the previous point, and that some points and
5
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notation for match and tournament, and let the utility of a player be additively separable in the
utility derived from winning the stage price and the disutility of exerting effort,
ui = w($)− c(ei) , (7)
where as before $ reflects the stage prize, and w(·) is a monotonically increasing function. The
cost of exerting effort, c(·), is an increasing and convex function of effort ei.
The probability of winning the match, and thus the stage prize, is a function pi(·) that
corresponds to the relative strength of play of both players at the match level, analogous to the
strength of play during a ball in condition (2). Then, the player’s problem is to choose effort in
order to maximize expected utility,
max
ei
Eui = max
ei
w($)pii (ai − aj , ei − ej , X))− c(ei) , (8)
where pii is defined as the probability of player i winning the match analogously to (3). As
before, this probability can be shown to depend on the relative strength of play during the
match. Hence, pi(·) is a monotone transformation of Pimk as expressed in condition (6).10 Also
note that, analogously to (3), the probability pi(·) is characterized by a logistic distribution. The
optimal effort choice e∗i is characterized by the first order condition satisfying
∂Eui
ei
!= 0 ⇔ w($)∂pi(·)
∂ei
!=
∂c(ei)
∂ei
. (9)
Existence and uniqueness is ensured by the properties of the cost function c(·), and the function
governing the winning probability pi(·) of player i. The equilibrium effort allocation is given by
the effort of player i, e∗i , and the corresponding effort level of the competitor player, e
∗
j , such
that neither player has an incentive to deviate from his choice given the other player’s choice
and the environment, implying
e∗i =
(
c′
)−1(
w($)
∂pi(·)
∂ei
)
. (10)
Condition (9) directly delivers several testable hypotheses concerning the optimal effort
choice. Consider first the favorite’s effort choice, e∗f : Everything else equal, the equilibrium
effort of the favorite player, ef , is higher, the higher the stage prize $; and the lower the ability
difference to the underdog, (af − au) .11 Concerning the underdog’s effort choice, a similar set
games are more important to players than others. Similarly Walker and Wooders (2001) provide evidence from
ten tennis matches that the observed serving behavior is consistent with an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
10 In particular, the probability is strictly monotonically increasing and concave in the average number of games
per set the player wins.
11 The first result follows directly from condition (9); the second result follows from the fact that the marginal
change in the probability of winning ∂pi(·)/∂ei is equal to the density in the distribution of ²u− ²f evaluated at
the respective ability differential af − au. Since the error distribution is logistic and the density of the logistic
has a mode at 0, equilibrium effort is highest for equally strong opponents with af = au who then exert the
same effort in equilibrium.
6
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of results can be derived: Everything else equal, the equilibrium effort of the underdog player,
eu, is higher, the higher the stage prize $; and the lower his (relative) ability (af − au).12
3.3 Empirical Implementation and Identification
The simple framework illustrates how the incentive effects arising from the stage prize and the
player heterogeneity rest on the assumption that players can affect their winning probability,
and thus their probability of winning the prize, by choosing the effort with which they play. In
most previous empirical studies using e.g. data on golf tournaments, effort is observed directly
in terms of individual scores, and the tournament winner is determined by who requires the
smallest number of hits f r all rounds. Most importantly, effort is easily observed for each
player independently of other players, and a measure of ability in terms of a ranking is available.
In tennis, on the other hand, as in corporate tournaments, a player’s effort is hardly observable
independently from the opponent, posing a particular conceptual difficulty for testing effects of
prizes and heterogeneity in ability on absolute rather than relative performance.
However, it is intuitive that not only relative, but also absolute efforts of both players affect
the observed outcomes in terms of games. While a player affects his probability to win the
match by his (absolute) effort choice, the probability is essentially a function of relative effort,
as is illustrated by the simple framework presented before.
Testing the hypothesis about the incentive effects of stage prizes is straightforward, since
the only way that stage prizes can enter the optimization is through effort exertion, illustrated
by condition (9). Testing the hypothesis about heterogeneity leading to lower effort provision
in uneven tournaments is a little more intricate than testing for incentive effects of prizes. Note
that heterogeneity in ability afmk−aumk can be measured by the difference of the players’ ATP
ranking before the match. Recalling the empirical specification of strength of play given by (6)
and the behavioral model presented before, ability differences enter the individual optimization
problem in two ways. The total effect of players’ heterogeneity is given by
d lnPimk
d(afmk − aumk) =
∂ lnPimk(·)
∂(afmk − aumk) +
∂ lnPimk(·)
∂eimk
∂eimk
∂(afmk − aumk) . (11)
A higher superiority of the favorite over the underdog in terms of ability necessarily leads to a
larger differential in the strength of play between the two, and therefore to quicker and clearer
decisions, that is more games won by the favorite and fewer by the underdog. This is the
12 Note that for the underdog, condition (9) has to be rewritten analogously, since the probability of winning the
match is determined by the inverse strength of play. Again, the first result follows directly from this first order
condition; the second result follows from a similar argument as before concerning the change in the winning
probability, which corresponds to the logistic density function.
7
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case even if the efforts of the players are not affected by heterogeneity in their ability. This
plain capability effect is given by ∂ lnPimk/∂(aimk − ajmk) = α, the first term in condition
(11). However, as was shown in the last section, both players exert less effort when the chances
of winning are more unequal, as exemplified by a higher superiority of the favorite over the
underdog, (afmk − aumk). Using the number of games won per set as outcome variable, agency
theory would predict that the total number of games decreases with the heterogeneity of the
two players. This is the incentive effect of the heterogeneity as predicted by tournament theory,
the second term on the right hand side of condition (11).13 Hence, heterogeneity affects the
observable outcome variable through a direct capability effect, the first term on the right hand
side of equation (11), and an indirect effort effect, the second term.
Distinguishing capability and incentive effects is important. From the tournament designer’s
view, the incentive effect is crucial, since it can be affected by the appropriate incentive scheme,
while capability is a datum. From a methodological point of view, testing tournament theory
essentially means identifying the incentive effect from the plain capability effect, which is only
of secondary interest. The main empirical problem arises from the fact that effort, or the
difference in effort exertion eimk−ejmk, is unobservable in the data. In order to identify whether
a potential effect of heterogeneity on the outcome variable merely captures a plain capability
effect, or whether it really involves an incentive effect, one can exploit the different impact of
heterogeneity on the optimal decisions of favorite and underdog, as is shown now. In particular,
the indirect effort effect, the second term of equation (11), is unambiguously negative for both
favorite and underdog, given the results from the optimal effort decisions presented before:
Both players decide to exert less effort the larger the capability difference between favorite and
underdog (i.e. the larger afmk − aumk). On the other hand, the direct capability effect tends
to increase the relative strength of play of the favorite, ∂Pfmk/∂(afmk − aumk) = α > 0, while
it decreases the relative strength of play of the underdog, ∂Pumk/∂(afmk − aumk) = −α < 0.
Suppose now the conjecture were true that the relative strength of play, reflected by the number
of games per set a player wins, were entirely driven by capability differences, not by incentive
effects. Then, larger heterogeneity would lead, everything else equal, to more games won by the
favorite, and fewer games won by the ex ante weaker player, whose deficient capability reduces
his winning probability for every single point. If incentive effects also played a role, the relative
strength of play of the underdog would still be lower the larger the relative strength of the
13 Since the direct effect of prizes on observable outcomes, ∂ lnPimk/∂$ is zero, any effect of $ on
Pimk reflects an effort effect, which is supposedly positive, given the previous analysis: One expects
(∂ lnPimk(·)/∂eimk)(∂eimk/∂$mk) > 0, since by assumption, effort increases the games won, ∂ lnPimk/∂e > 0,
while a higher prize in turn increases effort.
8
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favorite because both capability and incentive effects work in the same direction. Concerning
the favorite the overall effect on the relative strength of play is ambiguous: a larger capability
difference would tend to increase relative performance, while an opposing incentive effect that
leads to lower effort exertion decreases relative performance. Hence, by looking at favorites and
underdogs separately, one can identify whether heterogeneity has an effect on incentives and
effort exertion in tennis matches.
Econometrically, this identification strategy can be seen as consequence of the omission of
unobserved relevant variables, namely effort, in the estimation. Suppose regressing the number
of games per set won by player i, on the explanatory variables of interest, relative ability and
relative effort, neglecting for the moment other relevant observable controls X, such that
lnPimk = αi(aimk − ajmk) + βeimk + uimk , (12)
where (a˜fmk − a˜umk) is the observed heterogeneity in terms of the rank difference between
favorite and underdog. Then it is easy to show that a regression taking only into account the
observable relative ability difference, (afmk − aumk), yields biased and inconsistent estimates,
with
EOLS(αˆi) = αi +
αCov ((afmk − aumk) , eimk)
V ar ((afmk − aumk)) ,
as long as the incentive effect is present, i.e., Cov ((afmk − aumk) , eimk) 6= 0. Note that accord-
ing to the behavioral model presented before, this incentive effect is negative for favorites and
underdogs, i = f, u. On the other hand, we have αf = −αu as consequence of the direct capa-
bility effect. Hence, the omitted variable bias provides an opportunity for a testable restriction
imposed by the existence of an incentive effect: any asymmetry in the effects of heterogeneity
between favorites and underdogs that blurs the pure capability effect can be interpreted as the
consequence of an incentive effect at work.
4 Empirical Application and Results
A direct but somewhat restrictive way of testing for the existence of an incentive effect of player
heterogeneity can be obtained by estimating the following empirical model
lnPimk = α+ α1Favimk + α2HETimk + βHETimk ∗ Favimk + γ1Zmk + γ2Xk + uimk , (13)
where Pimk is the average number of games per set (or match) that player i won during match
m in tournament k, measuring the strength of play of player i. The variable Favimk is a binary
indicator variable taking the value 1 if player i is the favorite in match m of tournament k,
9
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and zero if he is the underdog. HETimk = (aimk − ajmk) is a measure of heterogeneity of the
relative strength of the contestants at the outset of the match. The baseline measure is the
difference between the player’s own ATP rank and that of his opponent. Note that favorites,
that is players with a lower ranking than their opponent, are associated with negative values for
HET , while underdogs exhibit positive values. Consequently, if the heterogeneity term exhibits
different coefficients for favorites and underdogs the null that no incentive effect is present in
the results can be rejected.
Since using the difference of ranks as heterogeneity neglects that quality differences are
likely to be larger among low ranked players, i.e. higher among the top ten than among players
ranked 91 to 100, I also construct the heterogeneity measure proposed by Klaassen and Magnus
(2003), which takes the pyramid structure of quality prevalent in tennis explicitly into account.
The measure is based on the round of the tournament in which each player is expected to
drop out, and transforms linear ranks into a logarithmic measure of relative strength of player i,
Ri = K−log2(RANKi), withK being the number of rounds played in the respective tournament
k (i.e. 6 in Masters and 7 in Grand-Slams), and RANKi being the ATP-ranking. Note that the
better ranked a player is, the later he is expected to drop out of the tournament, implying a
higher measure Ri. The measure of relative strength of player i against opponent j in match m
in tournament k is computed as HETKMimk = Rj − Ri. Given that higher R-measures indicate
better players, HETKMimk , similar to the plain rank difference, should have a negative effect on
individual effort, because it is negative if i is the favorite and positive if i is the underdog. The
capability effect predicts a negative coefficient on HET for underdogs, but a positive coefficient
for favorites. Zmk contains information on the level of matches, such an indicator for a final as
opposed to a semi-final, and Xk are tournament characteristics. In the estimations presented
below, I use a full set of tournament and year dummies throughout.14 Note that all regressors
are predetermined before the respective tournament or match starts. Since the performance of
the players of a particular match is interdependent, I allow the residuals u to be clustered on
the level of a match, and report robust standard errors.
The hypothesis to be tested is that heterogeneity of players does not unfold an incentive
effect, and that therefore any observable outcomes are exclusively driven by a capability effect.
14 To control for effects of the rules of tennis on the number of games, I also added Winnerimj as an indicator
whether player i eventually lost the match m in tournament k as additional control, even though this does
not constitute a predetermined variable. The results are qualitatively unchanged. Experiments using data on
characteristics such as soil surface, season, month, outdoor dummy, tournament size in terms of the number
of participants, and tournament type (grand slam or not) instead of tournament dummies lead to essentially
identical results. While also leading to similar results, I do not report findings when adding the respective
rank of the player as additional explanatory variable, since it is not clear why the absolute rank in addition to
relative strength should matter for the observed performance. Detailed results are available on request.
10
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Table 2: Evidence for Incentive and Capability Effects for different player categories: Interactions
Dependent Variable:
ln(Games Won per Set) ln(Games Won per Match)
Favorite 0.084** -0.008 0.084** -0.008
[0.034] [0.047] [0.034] [0.047]
Heterogeneity -0.002*** -0.002***
(own-opponent rank) [0.001] [0.001]
Heterogeneity -0.056*** -0.045***
(Klaassen/Magnus, 2003) [0.014] [0.011]
Interaction Term 0.001* 0.030** 0.001* 0.009*
[0.001] [0.013] [0.000] [0.005]
Match is final -0.006 -0.005 0.002 0.003
[0.017] [0.017] [0.006] [0.006]
Tournament Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 920 920 920 920
R2 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.1
Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets.∗∗∗Coefficient significant at the 1-%-level. ∗∗Coefficient
significant at the 5-%-level. ∗Coefficient significant at the 10-%-level. Coefficients for constant terms are
omitted for brevity.
A coefficient estimate of β that is significantly different from zero would allow to reject the
hypothesis that no incentive effect is present.
The results presented in Table 2 provide support for this conjecture, regardless of whether
one uses the games won per set or per match as dependent variable, and regardless of the measure
for heterogeneity used: the interaction term is positive and significant. This indicates that, for
the same level of heterogeneity, underdogs do significantly better than favorites, implying that
a negative incentive effect moderates the positive effect of a stronger ability on the favorites’
performance relative to the underdogs.
A less restrictive specification allows all coefficients to be different for favorites and under-
dogs. Consequently, we also estimate a model like,
lnPimk = α+ βHETimk + γ1Finalmk + γ2Zmj + γ3Xj + εimk , (14)
The OLS estimation results displayed in the left panel of Table 3 show a negative effect
of heterogeneity on the outcome variable for underdogs as expected from both capability and
incentive effects.
In contrast, heterogeneity has smaller impact on favorites’ performance, which is inconsistent
with an explanation based exclusively on capability, but consistent with slacking-off due to
reduced effort. A possible explanation for this would be that favorites happen to win most of
11
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their matches, while the rules of the game imply that the number of games won by the winner
exhibits less variation than that won by the loser of a match. The effect of heterogeneity on
the outcome variable should thus be downward biased for winners relative to that of losers. To
test whether this explanation plays a role, I estimate the model separately for underdogs and
favorites who lost their match, and whose number of scores is not constrained by the rules of
the game. The results are depicted in the right panel of Table 3. Looking at losers who were
underdogs, again the effect of individual relative ex ante weakness is significant and negative.
However, the empirical results show a positive but insignificant coefficient for heterogeneity in
the favorites’ sample, implying that the larger the predominance of a favorite, the fewer games
he scores. This is only consistent with the incentive effect counteracting the capability effect,
with both effects being apparently approximately equally strong. Moreover, simple t-tests show
that the difference in the heterogeneity effects on the outcome variable between favorites and
underdogs is significant. Results for the log of the share of games won per match rather than
per set as outcome variable are qualitatively similar.15
5 Conclusion
The empirical results presented in this paper support the theoretical implication that effort ex-
ertion in tournaments is highest for homogeneous contestants. In particular, the results provide
evidence for an adverse incentive effect due to heterogeneity that counteracts the capability effect
for favorites, while both effects reinforce each other for underdogs. While the application used
data from professional tennis, the point made in this paper is more general. The widespread use
of tournaments in corporations and organizations, the substantial heterogeneity of contestants
in these tournaments, and the lack of reliable information about effort exertion emphasize the
importance of devising identification strategies that allow the tournament designer to evaluate
whether the intended incentives actually affect individual behavior. The approach shown above
is a first step in this direction. In future research, it would be interesting to apply the model to
(potentially more detailed) data from different sports, contexts and environments.
15 These results are not reported for brevity but available upon request.
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